Saturday, 16th December, 1944
By December 1944, the Ardennes region has become popularly known as the ‘Ghost Front’, a quiet place where American units decimated by earlier fighting in the Hürtgen Forest further to the north are sent to rest and recuperate. Here, German and American artillery fire upon each other when they want to register potential targets. The patrols each side send out probe each other’s positions more for practice and to season ‘green’ troops. There are few hostile acts between the two sides even though, along the whole 85-mile front, both sides are more-or-less within small arms range of one another.
Achieving an understanding of much of the rhythm of the fighting to come is helped by understanding the terrain and the weather conditions of the region. The Ardennes region that spans eastern/southern Belgium, northern Luxembourg and western Germany is generally conducive to harsh weather systems. The area sits astride the boundary between where two of Europe’s main climatic regions meet with generally wetter weather moving from the northwest and the colder, drier weather moving westwards from the Russian steppes. The weather conditions that prevail in the Ardennes and Eifel regions each winter are severe resulting in a lot of rainfall, thick fog, freezing weather conditions that can often average five months in the year, deep snow – when it falls – and biting winds that whip across the high ground or snake their way through the valleys and re-entrants below. December 1944 proves to be the coldest winter on record.
Because of its appeal for tourists during the early part of the twentieth century, back in 1944, the road network across the region is generally better than one would imagine which is surprising considering the low population density. All of the main roads that traverse the region where the fighting is to come have hard surfaces but few are straight, particularly the ones running east to west. In some places, one can drive in a straight line along some of the wider valley floors or contouring some of the exposed ridgelines. For the most part though, the roads are crooked particularly towards the eastern end of the massif where they wind around steep-sided gorges via narrow hairpin bends. The effect of this is that it will favor the defender by funneling traffic along the routes, obliging the attacker to take detours down inferior routes when the roads are found to be blocked by obstacle or holding action.
Another physical consideration that will diminish the attacker’s ability to coordinate and sustain the offensive is the small hamlets and villages that characterize the region sitting astride key junctions and crossroads. The streets of these tiny communities are often funnelled into a single-lane obliging traffic to be channelled one way. They risk becoming easily choked by vehicles needing to move in both directions and by the tide of humanity that will be displaced by the fighting or by the movement of large bodies of prisoners or casualties that will head rearwards for processing or treatment.
Movement across country in most places to circumvent these choke points will prove not to be possible either for the most part as this will both drain precious fuel supplies and traffic will anyway become channelled by the densely forested areas. Further, the weather will hamper cross-country movement even more because, while the soil structure permits tanks to traverse when the ground is frozen, it will turn into a claggy mire when it rains. This means that most of the mechanized forces will be obliged to use the roads with all of the challenges already identified.
One thus has a sense of the impact that will be caused by the weather and the terrain on the overall momentum of the advance when it comes as well as upon freedom of movement. The force and energy of the forthcoming assault then risks being diminished as the advance becomes either channelled or dispersed. Movement control as well as logistical implications will further exacerbate the problems. The short planning time imposed on grounds of secrecy means that mistakes will be made causing chaos in rear echelons as vital resupplies cannot move forward owing to congestion ahead.
It is under cover of the forecasted poor weather conditions and through this daunting terrain that Hitler orders Field Marshall Model to assemble three armies in secret. The plan will be to break through on the Ardennes front between Monschau in the north and Echternech in the south hoping to repeat the success of previous offensives through the same terrain undertaken, albeit in the summer months, in 1870, 1914 and 1940. The attack will be aimed at brushing aside the weakly-held American positions, aiming to cross the Meuse River between Liège and Namur, bypass Brussels and reach Antwerp, the final objective…all within one week. With poor weather conditions that will hamper the Allies strategic advantage of airpower, Der Tag X is set for 16th December, 1944.
At the outset of the battle, the odds favour the Germans by 10:1 as they quietly move 250,000 troops, nearly 2,000 pieces of artillery, 1,000 tanks, and assault guns into position in complete secrecy. In addition to the frontal attack, a handful of picked men will be masquerading as American soldiers in U.S. Army uniforms driving captured U.S. vehicles to get behind the frontlines. These Greif Kommandos will seize key points, such as the bridges over the Meuse, spread rumors, sow chaos, give false orders and directions, and create panic and confusion in the Allied rear.
The assault led by SS-Oberst Gruppenführer Sepp Dietrich’s 6th Panzer Armee on the northern flank of the advance will be led by the I SS Panzer Korps. This in turn will be spearheaded by the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler’s Kampfgruppe (KfG) ‘Peiper’ led by twenty-nine year old SS-Obersturmbannführer – or Lieutenant Colonel – Joachim Peiper.
KfG Peiper is the best-equipped battlegroup with 4,800 men and 600 vehicles. Their task will be to push ahead and to seize the bridges on the Meuse River between Liège and Huy by the end of the third day of fighting, the 18th December. The routes assigned to Peiper include narrow and, as seen, single-lane roads that will compel his force to advance in a single column roughly sixteen miles long.
Peiper complains that the roads allocated to him are barely suitable for bicycle movement, let alone the seventy Tiger II, thirty-five Panther, forty-five PzKpfw IV, forty-five Tiger I and 149 half-tracked vehicles, as well as eighteen 105-mm, six 150-mm artillery pieces and countless trucks that form his command. These complaints are brushed aside and he is told by his bosses that it doesn’t matter if he only has one panzer left by the time he gets there but he must reach his objectives on time. To address the shortage of fuel he will face, he is shown the location of U.S. fuel depots along his route and told to seize what he can as he advances. The defenses of these depots are expected to be light.
Success for the Germans thus relies on speed, momentum and aggression. No delays can be permitted in order for the objectives to be achieved and indeed, initially, complete surprise is achieved. This is largely thanks to a combination of Allied hubris over the state of the German forces facing them, preoccupation with their own offensive plans, a misreading of the intelligence and poor reconnaissance.
Hitler’s assessment is that the Americans will not make a stand and that the Allied chain-of-command will anyway take too long to respond. His miscalculation too is that the Allied coalition will turn in on itself under such strain when it comes. He also places a lot of faith in the Teutonic god of thunder, Donar, who Hitler has deemed will uphold his side of the bargain.
As we shall see, all of these assumptions prove wrong. Even Donar got distracted. The plan begins to unravel almost immediately in large part due to the actions of small groups of determined defenders that throw spoil into the machinery of the offensive with disastrous consequences for Hitler’s ambitions.
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One such group is the Intelligence and Reconnaissance (I&R) Platoon of the U.S. 394th Infantry Regiment, one of the unit’s comprising the U.S. 99th “Checkerboard” Division fresh to the front.
The eve of battle finds this platoon on an unremarkable ridgeline overlooking the small hamlet of Lanzerath, about a mile from the German border. In command is Lt. Lyle Bouck Jr, a pre-war army volunteer who has done well with his career, now holding a commission having risen through the ranks. Because of the skills required to do their job, the men of any I&R platoon are generally older and more experienced than most infantry sub-units. Bouck is just twenty years old and is looking forward to his twenty-first birthday on 17th December.
About a mile to the north of Bouck’s position, his regiment, the 394th U.S. Infantry Regiment is also protecting a vital crossroads at Losheimergraben through which the international highway that dissects the Belgian and German borders runs. This will be one of the major routes or rollbahns along which the German 6th Panzer Armee, including KfG Peiper, will advance. Capture of the crossroads is vital in order to open up other designated rollbahns.
Nearly a mile to the north-west, to his rear, men of the 394th are also defending an area surrounding the tiny railway station at Buchholz. The railway line running through the area neatly dissects the battalion boundaries. The 99th’s exposure is further enhanced by its three infantry regiments (393rd, 394th and 395th) being strung out across a 25-mile front mostly covered by thick forest and generally isolated from one another.
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Lanzerath lies astride a road that leads westwards, deep into the corps’ rear areas. Several miles to the north lies the high ground of the Elsenborn Ridge beneath which lie the so-called “Twin Villages” of Krinkelt and Rocherath east of which the 99th Division’s 393rd Infantry Regiment is positioned in the deep forest that spans the frontier.
The village is supposed to be the responsibility of the neighboring VIII Corps and the U.S. 14th Cavalry Group. However, they are stretched so thinly themselves that they have no units available to occupy the tiny collection of fifteen houses in force. Consequently, the decision is taken that Bouck and his understrength platoon of eighteen men will deploy about half a mile south of their regiment’s area of responsibility to provide advance warning of any attack. While their main function is to provide early warning of troop movements it is not ordinarily to fight.
The 394th’s I&R Platoon move to Lanzerath on 10th December 1944. In addition to their main function to gather intelligence about the enemy and to conduct reconnaissance across the ground, they are told to serve as a plug in the gap that exists between not only two U.S. divisions but the boundary between two (V and VIII) American corps. In effect, this means that, even though they are physically not far from their regiment, because they are across a corps boundary means they might as well be on another planet in terms of the help and support they can expect from their own assets.
For reasons that still baffle, this critical boundary also sits astride the very same approach route that invading armies have taken back-and-forth across the centuries, through the fabled Losheim Gap. This historical nugget is perhaps lost to the G.I.’s from across the ocean defending the ‘Ghost Front’.
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The village itself sits on sloping terrain which has changed little in the intervening years. It has its main approach road coming from the east and, on the other side, at the top of the village, the road forks with one minor road heading west towards Buchholz and the other heading roughly north-east towards the vital crossroads at Losheimergraben about 1,000 yds away. However, during their earlier retreat during the autumn the Germans have destroyed the bridge over the steep-sided railway cutting on the road linking Lanzerath and Losheimergraben.
The positions assumed by the I&R Platoon are in the treeline of a forestry block atop the high ground 200 yds above the village. From here, they have an excellent view of the Losheim Gap in the distance provided the sky is clear.
Also quartered within the village along the southern edge of Lanzerath is a fifty-five man detachment from the 820th Tank Destroyer Battalion. This includes reconnaissance troops from the 14th Cavalry Group. Together, this detachment is designated ‘Task Force X’.
Adjacent to Task Force X, a four-man team of artillery observers from C Battery, 371st Field Artillery has taken up position in a house in the village, which gives them a good view from the top floor towards the distant town of Losheim in Germany from which any likely threat will come…if it is to come.
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Consistent with their role, the I&R platoon are well armed with light weapons and a single, jeep-mounted .50 cal heavy machine gun. However, they possess no indirect fire weapons such as medium or even light mortars. To reinforce their redoubt, they begin to put overhead protection above their trenches using logs and earth to protect them from mortar and small arms fire. A two-strand, four foot high barbed wire fence dissects the snow-covered field ahead of them that slopes down towards the village at an angle of about 25°-30°. This obstacle will prove critical in the forthcoming battle.
In his seminal work ‘The Bitter Woods’, John D. Eisenhower writes that, on the morning of the 16th December 1944, in the tree line above Lanzerath, “a heavy layer of snow covered the ground, and the weather was damp and cold”. The temperature that morning hovers around zero but, up in the tree line, the wind chill makes it feel much colder. A freezing fog that rolls in on their position only magnifies the misery of those members of the I&R platoon huddled together in their two-man foxholes.
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Until around 05.15 hrs, it seems like any other morning. It isn’t due to begin to get light for another three hours when suddenly, across the entire front, the Germans switch on searchlights which they use to bounce off the low cloud base. This creates an artificial moonlight to help their troops infiltrate the U.S. positions. This is a trick they have learned from the British who had used it to great effect earlier in the year during the Normandy campaign. For the men on the hill already shrouded in fog, the light is strange and disorientating and the source indiscernible.
Then suddenly, at 05.30 hrs, in addition to this eerie, spell-binding light, the Germans begin their fierce artillery barrage. This involves around 1,800 pieces of artillery firing in waves which tears into the American positions across the whole northern front. This creeps back and forth across the lines for about ninety minutes.
Such is the accuracy that the bombardment quickly severs telephone wires and cables creating chaos and destruction. Across the front, multiple explosions erupt around the U.S. forward positions that are deafened, blinded and muted by the assault. The morning darkness is illuminated by bursts from medium and large guns, plus railway artillery, which has been shunted secretly into position way behind the German front lines. Veterans later report that the sky is also filled with the “putt-putt-putt” of V-1 rockets flying overhead being used as a tactical weapon against American nodal points to sow fear and confusion in the rear.
Confused themselves by what is happening, the men of Bouck’s I&R platoon take cover in their dugouts. Up in the tree line, most of the rounds fall short into the snow-covered pasture in front of them. Those rounds that do strike the forest, cause little damage due to the overhead protection the I&R men have prepared.
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Around 07.15 hrs, as an eerie silence now descends once the bombardment has ceased, the men of Coy B, 1/394th up at the Losheimergraben crossroads see an American jeep manned by Germans approach their position out of the gloom of the thick fog from the direction of Losheim. The jeep halts close to one of the 57mm anti-tank guns that the Americans have concealed. In the diffused glare of the spotlights, the gun crew hesitate to fire. The jeep suddenly turns around and speeds off back towards Losheim.
A few minutes later, the jeep reappears leading a StuG III 75mm self-propelled assault gun belonging to the 1012th StuG Co. The approach has to be by the road because of the heavy forest either side. The gun crew let the jeep pass but fire on the StuG immobilizing it with their first shot. The third shot sets the vehicle alight. Further towards the crossroads, the occupants of the jeep are killed.
Shortly before 07.45 hrs, with the sounds of battle already raging to their north around Losheimergraben, Lyle Bouck calls the regiment’s S-2, Major Robert Kriz via the only means of communication now available to him, his SC-300 radio. He asks for permission to withdraw but Kriz instead tells him to send out a small patrol to find out what’s going on.
As the patrol is preparing to move out, they are astonished to see the vehicles of Task Force X firing up and leaving Lanzerath via the left hand fork in the road at the top of the village and heading north west towards Honsfeld. All that remains down in the village now are the four-man artillery observer team comprising Lt. Warren Springer, Sgt. Peter Gacki, Technician Fourth Grade Willard Wibben and Technician Fifth Grade Billy Queen. As Task Force X leaves the village, Warren Springer manages to flag one of the departing vehicles down to be told they are leaving because a large German force is reported to be heading their way.
To Bouck’s rear, as the night finally makes way for an insipid dawn, the commanding officer of 3/394th, Maj. Norman Moore calls for two platoons to be sent to his command post at Buchholz Station. German troops have been spotted advancing along the railway line from Losheim towards his position using the steep cutting that lies equidistant between Lanzerath and Losheimergraben as cover. All around Lanzerath, German infantry is beginning to infiltrate around the American lines via the thick forestry blocks but, as yet, none have been spotted in the village.
Meanwhile, up at Losheimergraben, the German forces (from 990th Regt of 277th VG Div) have begun their attack in earnest. The normally meagre morning chorus in this usually quiet backwater is suddenly amplified by the crackle of small arms fire and the crump of mortar and heavy artillery fire that slowly drives them back.
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While all of this is going on, German troops of the 9th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Fallschirmjäger Division advance westwards towards Lanzerath, clearing a series of villages along their route of American outposts. Other units are also pouring through the Losheim Gap and heading south-westwards towards U.S positions at Manderfeld and Krewinkel. Their aim is to serve as the right hand pincer looking to achieve an encirclement around two regiments of the 106th “Golden Lions” Division dug in on the high ground south of the Losheim Gap, known as the “Schnee Eifel”.
In amongst this growing maelstrom, Bouck leads Plt Sgt Bill Slape, Cpl John Creger and Pte Bill James the short distance down the slope into the village. They repair the broken fixed telephone wires as they progress as best they can.
They arrive in the village around 08.20 hrs and enter one of the houses that had been used as a forward observation post. Upstairs, they encounter a local villager on the telephone speaking German. It is not clear if he is relaying information to the Germans. Bouck is suspicious but decides to let him go anyway. They see him smiling as he leaves the house and heads elsewhere to a neighbours house.
Around 08.45 hrs, the patrol sees the first German paratroopers moving towards the village so Bouck and James head back up the slope to their positions. They are joined there by the four artillerymen. Gacki, Wibben and Springer are shown to one of the dugouts. Billy Queen is sent to another. The total number of defenders in and around Lanzerath is now just twenty-two. They are just in time as the Fallschirmjäger’s 1st Battalion, 500 men strong, are marching into Lanzerath but Bill Slape and John Creger are still down in the village. If they are captured, Bouck’s force will be diminished further.
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Five minutes later up at Losheimergraben, another German attack is aimed at the American foxholes held by Coy G, 2/394th just to the east of the International Highway. With German infantry having infiltrated their positions Tech Sgt Fred Wallace calls in a fire mission and a battalion’s worth of 155mm artillery fire falls directly on his position fully disrupting the attack. His men are spared because of the overhead protection they have built above their trenches. The defense at this vital crossroads is holding.
Around 09.00 hrs, Bouck sends Pfc “Siv” Silvola, Pfc “Pop” Robinson and Cpl “Schnoz” McGehee down to help Creger and Slape get out. Around the fork in the road at the top of the village, they encounter a group of Germans from Fusilier Regiment 27 12th VG Div. who are trying to outflank the Losheimergraben crossroads to the west. After a brief exchange of fire, the three are captured. Both Silvola and Robinson are wounded. Bouck’s tiny force just got smaller.
As this is going on, Bouck is frantically trying to work out how to extract Slape and Creger while also trying to reach Major Kriz to update him. Seeing the size of the force down in the village below which has momentarily stopped while they search houses, Bouck realises now is the time for his reconnaissance platoon to withdraw since they have little chance of effectively engaging their enemy.
Finally connecting with Kriz around 09.30 hrs, Bouck is instead told to “hold at all costs” and await the arrival of reinforcements. As they are speaking, down in the village Slape and Creger hear Germans coming into the house where they are concealed. Slape heads up into the attic and quietly tries to radio Bouck to inform him what’s happening. As one of the Germans enters the room where Creger is now hiding himself alone, he conceals himself behind the door and readies himself for what may come next.
Instead, finding nothing, the German heads back downstairs and both Slape and Creger take advantage of a crescendo in the fighting elsewhere and the distraction it afforded to make their escape. They head out of the rear of the house, through a cow barn crawling beneath a cow and heading out the back door.
Running back up the hill towards the treeline in which the I&R platoon is still concealed, they are spotted and fired upon, bullets kicking up the snow as they strike the ground all around the two men. In order to try to help them, Bouck and PFC Risto Milosevich head down from the treeline using thickets of young trees as cover so as not to reveal themselves or their position.
Willing both men on, Bouck watches as Slape slips on some ice and falls, looking as though he has been hit but he rises and they all continue to the safety of the treeline and are not followed. As well as a fractured sternum and one of his ribs, Slape sees that the heel of his boot has been shot off. Despite the inevitable pain he is suffering, Slape takes up his position in his foxhole and will bravely soldier-on throughout the rest of the day displaying “extraordinary heroism and inspiring leadership against insurmountable odds.”
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Up in the treeline, the I&R platoon and the four artillery observers now ready themselves for the fight that is soon to come with what little they have. They realize their chances of surviving whatever comes next is slight and some are not happy about the order particularly considering the odds. Bouck calls headquarters again asking for artillery support but this does not come. Suddenly the consequences of positioning the I&R platoon outside the divisional boundary becomes evident. He is again told to hold at all costs.
In the meantime, fighting is continuing around Losheimergraben and along the railway cutting leading towards Buchholz station. A large force has already made it as far as the railway sidings at Buchholz but are being held there in a furious exchange with the American defenders.
Near the Lossheimergraben crossroads, a large number of German infantry close around the battalion’s mortar positions there. The situation is suddenly so desperate that the Squad leader, Sgt Delbert Stumpf orders the mortar tubes to be repositioned with the bipod legs propped on the edge of the emplacements so they can be fired almost straight up in the air. The powder increments in the mortar rounds are removed to reduce the time the mortar rounds spend in the air. He has no choice. The Germans are just 15 yds away from his positions and he risks being overwhelmed. While this is happening, he is calmly reporting the situation and his actions to his platoon command post. Yet again, the quick thinking actions of individuals save the moment. The attack is repelled and a number of prisoners are taken including a very short medic wearing an oversized helmet who reveals his cousin lives in Milwaukee.
Other than the brief exchange of fire up by the road fork earlier, the situation in Lanzerath itself is quiet even if all around, the forests are alive with the fierce struggle taking place. The tension is heightening for the I&R men up in the tree line as the ebb and flow of the sounds of battle surrounding them indicate the level of intensity and their thoughts inevitably drift towards their friends fighting to survive close by while, at the same time contemplating when it will become their turn. Each soldier will inevitably be going through his own ritual or reflection as they wait. Some will be calm. Others will be eating themselves up inside with anxiety.
Little do they yet realise though but, with each passing minute, the German timetable is being stalled. This will potentially have dire second and third order consequences that, in the days to come, will have strategic implications for the prosecution of the offensive and the steadfastness of the defense.
Around 10.00 hrs, Bouck notes the Fallschirmjäger look as though they are about to begin moving on from Lanzerath and he has no option other than to engage. Once they take the left fork in the road at the top of the town, he will be likely cut off. He quickly makes his appraisal and gives the order which is passed down the line of nine trenches that stretch along the edge of the woods overlooking the village that they will ambush the column as it moves out.
The order to hold fire is given and each man in the platoon takes aim, choosing a target as some 250 German paratroopers, with their mottled jump suits and distinctive helmets begin to walk up the road towards the fork.
Around 10.20 hrs, as the column inches towards the ambush “kill zone” he has identified, suddenly a young blond girl, Tine Scholz runs out of one of the houses at the northern end of the village. The men of the I&R platoon can see her shouting something to the German soldiers leading the column and appearing to point directly at the American positions. Agonizingly, Bouck waits until she is safely back inside the house before he gives the order to open fire but the element of surprise is lost. In despair, Bouck sees the paratroopers turn and face the slope and many begin to take cover. It is 10.30 hrs. The battle for Lanzerath has begun.
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Incredibly, the Fallschirmjägers make three attempts throughout the day to charge up the slope towards the treeline. Each time they are repelled. Each time, the Fallschirmjäger’s uniforms stand out in the dazzling white of the landscape, making themselves easy targets for the accurate American fire.
By 10.40 hrs, the first attack led by Hauptmann Schiffke and Hauptmann Fick has stalled with none of the paratroopers making it beyond the barbed wire fence. The second goes in at 10.55 hrs and the same tactics employed. No preparatory artillery or mortar fire to soften up the I&R platoon nor any attempt to outflank them. Just a simple “straight up the middle” tactic that reveals the inexperience both of the leadership and the rank-and-file many of which are not infantry but re-badged aircraftsmen. They are Fallschirmjäger in name only.
Each time the attackers flounder on the barbed wire, Bouck calls to Springer to request artillery fire. Incredibly, Springer is able to bring down several rounds but no more as his radio is then destroyed.
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At midday, the Germans negotiate a temporary truce with Bouck in order to allow them to retrieve their injured but, up in the tree line, they notice that the medics are carrying weapons which they’re not allowed to do. This raises suspicions that it is a ruse and that the Germans are using the lull in the fighting to try to determine better the American positions.
Around 14.00 hrs, a third German attack comes in and, during this time the artillery observer, Billy Queen is shot. He later dies at 15.15 hrs becoming the only defender to be killed during the battle. Queen’s body won’t be recovered until the following month. Meanwhile, as Bouck is on the radio with Lt. Bungee back at regimental headquarters, a rifle round smashes into his radio transmitter. Bouck is fortunate but PFC Louis Kalil less so as he is then hit in the jaw and cheekbone by a rifle-fired grenade which doesn’t explode but does terrible damage to Kalil’s face, an injury he will suffer from for the rest of his life.
As the third attack comes in, fighting is continuing around Losheimergraben and Buchholz and Bouck appreciates that he may soon be cut off. Miraculously, the Germans have still failed to appreciate the insignificance of the defense against them. The failure not to try to outflank them yet is baffling.
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During this third charge, the platoon’s only heavy ordnance, the .50 caliber jeep-mounted heavy machine gun gives out. The barrel is so hot that the machine-gun is firing on its own, cooking off the rounds in the breach. The firing stops altogether when the barrel warps.
Around 15.50hrs, Bouck sends his final message saying “We are holding our position. Enemy strength around seventy-five. They are moving from Lanzerath west towards railroad.” Bouck begins to fully appreciate the position he finds himself in. His communications are down and he is completely cut off from the outside world. His ammunition is running low and he is receiving no fire support. The number of wounded is rising and the concerns among his men are mounting. As dusk approaches, Bouck is finally contemplating a withdrawal under cover of darkness.
Realizing their plight, Bouck tells Slape to send two men, Corporal Sam Jenkins and PFC Robert “Mop” Preston back to the regiment or at least to the 3rd Battalion command post at Buchholz to tell them what’s happening. In the lengthening shadows of the day, both men set off and are never seen by the platoon again until after war.
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As darkness begins to fall around 16.00 hrs, the Germans launch their fourth assault only this time, they do decide to outflank the I&R positions easily coming in from the side and mopping up one trench after another. PFC Bill “Sak” James is sharing a dugout with Bouck and he is down to his last clip. As a paratrooper pokes his weapon into the dugout, Bouck pushes the barrel to one side just as the attacker squeezes the trigger and James is hit in the face at close quarters. Miraculously, he survives even though the right side of his face is terribly damaged.
Soon afterwards, with American resistance now ended, the Germans are finally able to take stock of their dead, the dying and the mauled who lay en masse in the pasture overlooking the village. Some ninety-six casualties – including up to forty killed – have been sustained out of the force of 500 who came into the village. The I&R platoon has suffered only one fatality but most of the men have some injury or other. They are led out of the treeline and down into the village where they are herded into the local coffee shop, the Café Palm.
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As a consequence of the delays, both the 1st SS Panzer Division led by KfG Peiper and the 12th SS Panzer Division are meant to have passed Losheimgraben by 12.00 hrs but by 19.30 hrs they are still trapped in a massive traffic jam. Behind these units are also SS Obersturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny’s ‘Greif‘ units which are supposed by this stage to be wreaking havoc behind the American lines dressed as American soldiers. They too have been unable to move. The blown bridge at the railroad pass is also preventing movement. Engineers have arrived but a single truck containing vital bridge parts is still stuck somewhere way back in the logistical tail of the various columns.
With mounting frustration because he knows he is behind schedule, Peiper decides to deviate from his allotted route, turning his vast column off the main road and down a side road towards Lanzerath. He advances, unnecessarily losing six panthers and some half-tracks to old German mines along the way which only heightens his deepening frustration. His approach to Lanzerath is also slowed further by the massive traffic jam from the vehicles and troops of the 3rd Fallschirmjäger and 12th Volksgrenadier Divisions, leading back into Germany held up by the resistance of Bouck’s I&R platoon.
Peiper finally makes it into Lanzerath arriving shortly before midnight on the 16th December just as Lyle Bouck turns twenty-one. There he finds the 9th Fallschirmjäger Regiment shaken by their losses during the day and Bouck witnesses Peiper vent his anger inside the Café Palm against the paratroopers who, since the battle, have failed to move beyond the village nor make any effort to see if the woods or way ahead are clear.
Shouting at the commanding officer of the 9th Fallschirmjäger Regiment, Oberst Helmut von Hoffmann in full view of the American prisoners and the paratroopers, Peiper demands that the regiment accompany his tanks as they clear the sector, finally leaving Lanzerath around 03.00 hrs in the morning.
Thereafter, the men of the I&R platoon have to walk into captivity. Their story doesn’t end there though and I would commend anyone to read “The Longest Winter” by Alex Kershaw to learn more about their extraordinary trials and tribulations that follow in the weeks and months ahead. It’s a remarkable read.
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Importantly, Bouck and his men went into captivity little appreciating what they had achieved and the disruptive effect they and the defenders at Losheimergraben had had on the timetable of the German advance. As seen, Peiper’s route has already been diverted via Lanzerath owing to the delays at Losheimergraben where the U.S were still defending. This hold-up had prevented the bridging equipment to be able to get through to rebuild the collapsed span across the steep railway cutting. Because the fighting continues up at Losheimergarben, as he leaves Lanzerath, Peiper is therefore obliged to detour once again and take the narrower route via the left hand fork in the road at the top end of the village towards Büllingen via Buchholz and Honsfeld. This has fatal consequences for the defenders and civilians of those small villages.
His advance has now been de-routed and delayed by eighteen hours. Such resolute action by these few determined men had indeed proven decisive but there were tragic consequences too in the following days as Peiper’s men exacted their revenge and frustration upon civilians and soldiers who stood in their way. The most notable of these was the massacre at the Baugnez crossroads near Malmédy around 14.00 hrs the following day in which eighty-five U.S. soldiers were slain. Also, scores of civilians were murdered along the way too. News of this massacre was quickly released by the U.S. military with the express intention of stiffening the resolve of the defenders and to deter them from surrendering.
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In 1947, Hugh M Cole in his wonderful work, “The Ardennes: The Battle of the Bulge”, briefly mentioned the platoon but did not discuss their pivotal role. The full story of the I&R platoon was not fully revealed until 1969 when John S D Eisenhower published his seminal work “The Bitter Woods”.
It wasn’t until 1979 that the platoon received full recognition for their action when a columnist wrote about the bureaucracy which had denied the platoon the recognition he considered it deserved.
Two years later, after much lobbying by New York Yankees owner George Steinbrenner who raised the issue with his friend, the then House Speaker Tip O’Neill, that a hearing was held in Congress. Special legislation was needed to enable the army to circumvent the regulations that prevented recommendations for awards being made more than two years after the event.
In 1981, the seventeen members of the I&R platoon still alive were awarded their medals: Bouck, Slape and Milosevich were each awarded the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC), while five Silver Stars, and nine Bronze Stars with Valor devices went to other members of the platoon. All four men of the artillery observation team, including the late Billy Queen were also awarded DSCs. Incredibly, they had each already been awarded the Silver Star in 1945 for their actions at Lanzerath because Lt. Springer had been well enough upon his release from captivity to write up the citations. Bouck’s health had not fared so well during his time as a prisoner-of-war. The I&R Platoon was also conferred with a Presidential Unit Citation. Bill James was already dead, having succumbed in 1977 to his terrible wounds but on 9th October 1981, his widow accepted a DSC on his behalf.
Thirty-seven years after the fact, the I&R platoon became the most heavily decorated small unit for a single combat action in World War II.
